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OPEN JUSTICE: CONCEPTS AND JUDICIAL 
APPROACHES 
Emma Cunliffe* 
ABSTRACT 
Recent years have seen an increase in the number and scope of non-publication orders 
and other limits on open justice, an increase in the number of statutes that regulate or 
threaten open justice and the articulation of an Australian constitutional principle (of 
institutional integrity) that has the potential to protect some aspects of open justice. 
The purposes and values of open justice are, however, rarely examined in a 
comprehensive or theoretically-informed manner. This article provides a theory of 
open justice which accounts for its heterogeneous nature. Australian judicial 
approaches to the substance, limits and constitutional dimensions of open justice are 
analysed in light of the purposes and values of open justice, and a comparison with the 
much more coherent Canadian approach is supplied. The author concludes that threats 
to open justice are best managed by an analytical framework which systematically 
identifies both the benefits of open justice and the countervailing values that are at 
stake in a given case, and which seeks to provide maximum protection to all of these 
values on a case-by-case basis.  
I INTRODUCTION  
This article considers the common law concept of 'open justice', and explores how 
Australian and Canadian courts have approached the requirements of open justice. 
The principles1 that information about court proceedings should be widely accessible 
and may be subject to discussion and critical comment (referred to in this article as the 
principles of open justice) are important ingredients of the rule of law and 
fundamental to democratic governance. Accessibility of information about courts and 
their activities is a necessary correlate to the principle that it should be possible to 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
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1  Section 2 of this article explains why, properly understood, there are multiple principles of 
open justice. 
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know the law, and helps safeguard the principle that citizens should be equally subject 
to law.  
My interest in open justice was first piqued by difficulties experienced in obtaining 
court records to research how well courts manage expert testimony in Australian 
criminal trials. This context offers an alternative perspective on the prevailing concern 
that open justice facilitates sensationalism or idle curiosity about court proceedings. 
Appeals to open justice are most often associated with media pressure to be permitted 
to report more (and more sensational) information about particular cases. It is 
relatively easy to point to examples of media coverage that illustrate the dangers of the 
open court principle.2 Nonetheless, it is an important goal for a rational, justice-
focused legal system to maximise the benefits of open justice while minimising the 
potential harms of access to information. Facilitating careful study of, and informed 
debate about, court proceedings strengthens the quality of judicial adjudication and 
improves public confidence in court processes. 
Open justice is often balanced against countervailing interests such as privacy 
rights and national security.3 While limits on open justice are necessary, my research 
into contemporary court practice suggests a turn to less transparent court processes. 
Some first-instance courts are adopting practices and policies that make it difficult to 
obtain access to information about court proceedings. For example, the Victorian 
Supreme Court routinely returns exhibits to filing parties so that they are not available 
for examination as part of the court record; the Victorian Magistrates' Court decides 
most committal hearings on the basis of affidavits rather than testimony but restricts 
access to these affidavits; and the number of non-publication orders issued by trial 
courts is increasing in several Australian jurisdictions.4 The practices adopted in 
contemporary trial courts in respect of open justice are uneven, but seem at times to 
fall considerably short of the ideal that restrictions on public access to court 
information should be exceptional and carefully delimited.5 Judicially administered 
justice, which was almost inviolably public throughout much of the 19th and 20th 
centuries, threatens to become increasingly private. At the same time, senior judges in 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
2  The manner in which media reported the OJ Simpson trial and the James Bulger case are 
notorious examples. See Joseph Jaconelli, Open Justice: A Critique of the Public Trial (Oxford 
University Press, 2002), appendix. In Australia, some aspects of the media coverage of 
Lindy Chamberlain's trial provide examples of sensational reporting; but certain journalists 
and newspapers consistently criticised the rush to condemn Chamberlain. See also Emma 
Cunliffe, Weeping on Cue: The Socio-Legal Construction of Motherhood in the Chamberlain Case, 
(LLM Thesis, University of British Columbia, unpublished, 2003).  
3  See Bentham's discussion of the relationship between publicity, privacy and secrecy. 
Jeremy Bentham, 'Rationale of Judicial Evidence' in John Bowring (ed), The Works of Jeremy 
Bentham: Vol. VI (London, 1843) 351–2. 
4  See, eg, the Criminal Procedures Act 2009 (Vic) pts 4.4, 4.7 and Magistrates' Court policies 
promulgated under that Act; Supreme Court of British Columbia, Court Record Access Policy 
(2011) <http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/supreme_court/media/>); Prue Innes (chair), Report 
of the Review of Suppression Orders and the Media's Access to Court Records and Information 
(Australia's Right to Know, 13 November 2008) <http://www.australiasrighttoknow. 
com.au/files/docs/Reports2008/13-Nov-2008ARTK-Report.pdf>.  
5  See Innes, above n 4, ch 2; Lord Neuberger MR, Report of the Committee on Super-Injunctions: 
Super-Injunctions, Anonymised Injunctions and Open Justice (Master of the Rolls, 20 May 2011) 
<http://www.judiciary.govuk/media/media-releases/2011/committee-reports-findings-
super-injunctions-20052011>).  
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several jurisdictions (including Canada, Australia, and the UK) have enlisted a range 
of common law and constitutional precepts to protect open justice. The aim of this 
article is to propose a conceptual framework that may help to bring coherence to future 
judicial consideration of the principles and limits of open justice, and to consider how 
well this framework is reflected in Australian and Canadian approaches to open 
justice. 
Contemporary manifestations of the privatisation of court processes vary by 
jurisdiction and context.6 They extend well beyond the terrorism prosecutions that 
have been the focus of much contemporary commentary on open justice and are well 
documented elsewhere.7 Given the depth and quality of existing literature, the special 
procedures adopted for terrorism prosecutions are not a primary focus of this article. 
Indeed, focusing exclusively on the exceptional example of terrorism makes it easier to 
overlook broader trends that are emerging in other contexts. This article identifies and 
analyses impulses towards privileging secrecy over openness within a variety of 
juridical contexts.  
Section 2 of this article offers a theoretical account of open justice. In contrast to 
existing accounts, I demonstrate that 'open justice' has numerous connotations. Open 
justice is therefore best described as a set of related principles, not as a single standard. 
Rather than having a coherent conceptual core, the idea of open justice gestures 
towards other key democratic and rule of law values. The multivariate nature of open 
justice makes it particularly susceptible to limitation in some contexts and jurisdictions.  
The third section of this paper considers how open justice has been treated in 
Australian case law and briefly compares that treatment with the Canadian approach. 
Having identified the common law principles that underpin the concept, section 3 
demonstrates that Australian and Canadian judges have adopted different approaches 
to open justice. The differences between the approaches in these two countries are 
partly attributable to Canada's constitutionalised human rights protections. However, 
the Canadian trend towards protecting open justice also reflects a broader judicial 
interpretation of common law principles. The Supreme Court of Canada has 
successfully articulated an approach to open justice that balances its benefits against 
the potential harms of publicity, while accounting for the variety of contexts in which 
open justice principles are engaged. By contrast, Australian courts have not yet 
generated a coherent articulation of the principles of open justice, nor have they 
adopted a consistent position regarding the limits of those principles. However, the 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
6  'Privatisation' commonly refers to the transfer of government functions and responsibilities 
to the private sector. However, it may also include the adoption of government practices 
that shield public processes from scrutiny. The latter definition is more pertinent in this 
context. Susan B Boyd, 'Challenging the Public/Private Divide: An Overview' in Susan 
B Boyd (ed), Challenging the Public/Private Divide: Feminism, Law, and Public Policy 
(University of Toronto Press, 1997). 
7  See, eg, Kent Roach The Unique Challenges of Terrorism Prosecutions: Towards a Workable 
Relation between Intelligence and Evidence (Research Studies of the Commission of Inquiry 
into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182, Supply and Services, 2010); 
Eric Metcalfe, Secret Evidence (Report, Justice, 10 June 2009) <http://www.justice. 
org.uk/resources.php/33/secret-evidence>; Andrew Lynch and George Williams, What 
Price Security? Taking Stock of Australia's Anti-Terror Laws (University of New South Wales 
Press, 2006). 
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seeds of such an approach may be apparent in the contemporary jurisprudence on the 
institutional integrity of Chapter III courts. 
II WHAT IS OPEN JUSTICE?  
Open justice is a core principle of the common law.8 In the United Kingdom and 
Canada, open justice possesses constitutional status.9 In these jurisdictions, the 
constitutional principle is strengthened by human rights protections.10 For example, 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides: 
2. Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: […] 
(b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press 
and other media of communication; 
[…] 
7. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be 
deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. 
Collectively, these provisions have been interpreted as guaranteeing a right to open 
justice that may be enforced by the participants in a court process or by the public. In 
Australia, as I detail in section 3, an emergent line of judicial reasoning arguably 
protects some aspects of open justice as an essential aspect of the institutional integrity 
of courts (in turn protected under Chapter III of the Australian Constitution). However, 
the normative content, applications and limits of open justice are rarely given 
comprehensive attention within legal scholarship.  
This section identifies a variety of practices encompassed by the term 'open justice'. 
I suggest that the commonly-stated principle, or right, of open justice is not a coherent 
and unified concept. Rather, it may be best understood as an ensemble of practices and 
defeasible presumptions. Understanding open justice as an ensemble concept has 
important ramifications for the manner in which open justice should be approached by 
courts tasked with balancing competing values. 
A satisfying theoretical account of 'open justice' must account for three key features. 
First, the purposes of open justice are multivalent, incorporating both educational and 
supervisory aspirations. Bentham characterised publicity about court processes as a 
safeguard to ensure that judges act in accordance with law, probity and evidence; as an 
incentive to honest testimony; and as a mechanism by which the moral dimensions of 
law could be broadly conveyed.11 Constitutional theories of the separation of powers 
contribute a fourth purpose to Bentham's list: given the courts' role as a check on 
legislative and executive power, courts are a key source of public information about 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
8  See, eg, Kimber v Press Association [1893] 1 QB 65; Re Vancouver Sun [2004] 2 SCR 332; In the 
Matter of an Application by Chief Commissioner of Police (Vic) (2005) 214 ALR 422; Neuberger, 
above n 5. 
9  See Neuberger, above n 5, 15; Edmonton Journal v Alberta [1989] 2 SCR 1326. 
10  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Pt I of the Constitution Act 1982 being Schedule B to 
the Canada Act 1982 (U.K), c.11 ss 2(b), 7; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 (entered into 
force 3 September 1953) as amended by Protocol 14 arts 6 (right to a fair and public 
hearing), 10 (freedom of expression) as re-enacted in Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) c 42, sch 
1.  
11  Bowring, above n 3, 351–72; see also Garth Nettheim, 'The Principle of Open Justice' (1984) 
8 Tasmanian Law Review 25. 
2012 Open Justice: Concepts and Judicial Approaches 389 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
legislative and executive activities. The second key feature is that open justice 
encompasses a tremendous variety of activities. In a given context, open justice can 
refer to: the principle that an interested citizen may attend court as a spectator; the 
interest in promoting full, fair and accurate reporting of court proceedings; the 
convention that a judge publishes reasons for decision; the capacity to access the 
textual records kept by a court; or the capacity to access documents filed but not yet 
used in court. In the criminal context, open justice overlaps with the accused person's 
right to know the case against him or her. A comprehensive explanation of open justice 
must account for this diversity of activities. Finally, open justice is not absolute and 
will yield in some circumstances to conflicting imperatives. Although often 
characterised as a right, it may be better described as a principle to be balanced against 
countervailing interests.12 
Given its multiple facets, open justice is perhaps best understood not as a single 
idea, but as a set of principles that mediate between courts and the public, and are 
underpinned by broader values.13 Specifically, open justice relates information about 
what happens in courts to other aspects of democratic governance and to the rule of 
law.14 These attributes apply to all of the disparate activities termed 'open justice', and 
have the potential to provide a touchstone for courts when deciding whether to 
expand or limit open justice in a particular case. In safeguarding public access to 
information about courts and their activities, open justice provides a set of principles 
that facilitate other liberal democratic values — the right to know the law and to 
understand its application, the salutary effects of permitting citizens to observe and 
evaluate the operation of government, and a repugnance for arbitrary power. 
However, the focus on information about court processes is a necessary but not 
sufficient definition of open justice — the common law places many limits on citizens' 
capacity to know about some aspects of the activities that occur in courts. The ban on 
knowing the substance of jury deliberations is an obvious example. Arguably, in order 
to be enlivened, an open justice principle must connect information about courts with 
another aspect of democratic participation or a dimension of the rule of law. 
Existing accounts of open justice tend to focus on one of its dimensions to the 
partial exclusion of others. For example, Joseph Jaconelli suggests that the 'ideal of 
open justice may be simply stated'.15 According to Jaconelli, it is a procedural 
dimension of the right to a fair trial, requiring openness in the hearing phase; it is also 
a means to an end (perhaps truth or justice, although Jaconelli does not specify).16 This 
characterisation privileges the supervisory aspects of open justice — particularly as 
they relate to scrutinising witnesses — and downplays educational and probity 
dimensions. In Jaconelli's view, any educational benefits of open justice are at risk of 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
12  See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press, 1977) 26-27; see 
also John Fairfax Publications v Ryde Local Court [2005] NSWCA 101. 
13  In suggesting that open justice is best understood as a set of principles, I am influenced by 
Daniel Solove's argument that privacy is a set of rights united by a series of family 
resemblances, but lacking a universal core. See Daniel Solove, 'Conceptualizing Privacy' 
(2002) 90 California Law Review 1087. 
14  David M Paciocco, 'When Open Courts Meet Closed Government' (2005) 29 Supreme Court 
Law Review (2d) 385, 389–90. 
15  Jaconelli, above n 2, 353. 
16  Ibid 353–5. 
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being overwhelmed by sensational reporting.17 He is primarily interested in access to 
courtrooms and the media's desire to disseminate criminal proceedings to a broader 
public, including by televising trials. Accordingly, Jaconelli pays less attention to 
judicial reasons and court records. Within this context, he argues for careful limits to be 
imposed on the 'trial as public spectacle'.18 
Within the US literature, open justice is often treated as promoting informed public 
debate about individual and corporate behaviour. Discussion tends to focus on 
whether more or less information should be publicly accessible about certain types of 
cases.19 A form of open justice principle — characterised as a citizen's right to know 
and discuss the details of civil and criminal proceedings — is frequently weighed 
against individual and corporate privacy interests.20 One important site of contest is 
obtaining access to materials discovered by a party in civil litigation, whether or not 
they are used in court.21 This engages quite different aspects of open justice from 
Jaconelli's discussion. The focus here is on the public capacity to assess activities 
undertaken by corporations and individuals in non-judicial contexts that predate the 
court proceeding. Court records, rather than courtrooms, are at the centre of the 
debate. Finally, the constitutional right to freedom of expression is at times engaged to 
argue for an unlimited power to obtain access to and publish court records whether or 
not they have been used in open court.22 The implication of discussions about 
discovered documents tends to be that privacy interests and open justice are in tension 
with one another, if not antithetical.23 The challenge that consequently arises is finding 
a proportionate course between privacy and access to public records.  
The literature on terrorism and open courts establishes a reconfigured emphasis of 
the various dimensions of open justice. For example, Kent Roach emphasises that open 
justice protects individual citizens from the exercise of arbitrary power by the state, 
secures freedom of expression and contributes to public confidence in judicial 
processes.24 Terrorism cases foreground concerns about the exercise of arbitrary state 
power. They correspondingly position judicial probity and the truthfulness of 
witnesses as subsidiary, though important, dimensions of the need to scrutinise 
government processes. The practice of closing courts establishes a focus on hearings 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
17  Ibid ch 9. 
18  Ibid 355. 
19  See, eg, Andrew D Goldstein, 'Sealing and Revealing: Rethinking the Rules governing 
Public Access to Information Generated through Litigation' (2006) 81 Chicago-Kent Law 
Review 375 (and other articles in that volume of the Chicago-Kent Law Review); Arthur R 
Miller 'Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts' (1991) 105 
Harvard Law Review 427. 
20  Goldstein, above n 19; Miller, above n 19; Caron Myers-Morrison, 'Privacy, Accountability 
and the Cooperating Defendant: Towards a New Role for Internet Access to Court Records' 
(2009) 62 Vanderbilt Law Review 921; Peter A Winn, 'Online Court Records: Balancing 
Judicial Accountability and Privacy in an Age of Electronic Information' (2004) 79 
Washington Law Review 307. 
21  Goldstein, above n 19; Miller, above n 19. In Australia, see Sharon Rodrick, 'Open Justice, 
the Media, and Avenues of Access to Court Documents' (2006) 29 University of New South 
Wales Law Journal 90. 
22  See especially Myers-Morrison, above n 20; Winn, above n 20. 
23  Bentham adopts a similar characterisation, Bowring, above n 3, 355. 
24  Roach, above n 7, 78–9. 
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and the power to report hearings.25 Procedures established to prevent the accused or 
the public from knowing some evidence challenge the capacity to gain access to and 
speak about court records and the judicial practice of writing and publishing reasons. 
However, concerns about rules that limit disclosure are most often characterised 
primarily as negatively impacting the accused person's right to a fair trial. Given this 
primary concern, the open justice dimension of a public right to know the details of a 
case frequently becomes supplementary.  
A final set of circumstances in which open justice is often invoked arises when 
judges are asked to prohibit publication of the identity of witnesses or parties, 
including the accused.26 The rationale given for this request varies, but may include 
protecting the privacy of victims of crime or other vulnerable individuals,27 protecting 
the privacy of an accused prior to conviction or of an offender after community 
release,28 or ensuring the safety of undercover police.29 A request to prevent 
publication of identity may include a request to suppress identity within the 
courtroom. The principles of open justice at stake in these contexts vary with the 
rationale, but are primarily concerned with the need to test the truth of a witness's 
account. Where state action is being protected through anonymity, concerns about 
executive power also arise. In cases where identity is suppressed, limits on open justice 
are defined by the conflict with rights to privacy, dignity and equality, and (where 
police or informers are protected) by tension with executive efficacy. 
The discussion of the principles of open justice offered here is not intended to 
provide a complete definition of open justice or a full list of the circumstances in which 
it may be engaged. Rather, the comparison of the treatments of open justice from a 
variety of contexts makes it apparent that open justice engages different principles at 
different moments. These principles draw in turn on a variety of underlying 
democratic and rule of law values. While each of these contexts involves the collection 
or transmission of information about judicial proceedings, not all aspects of judicial 
proceedings are susceptible to open justice. Equally, in every case in which open justice 
is engaged, something more than information is at stake. In other words, information 
about court proceedings is the subject of open justice, but this is not a sufficient 
definition of open justice. In fact, open justice cannot usefully be reduced to a single 
definition. One way of understanding open justice is that it comprises an ensemble of 
practices with various purposes, exercised in diverse ways, and subject to potential 
limitations where conflict arises with other fundamental values. Any discussion of 
contemporary approaches to open justice is strengthened by bearing these 
characteristics in mind. 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
25  So-called super-injunctions raise similar concerns. See Neuberger, above n 5, ch 2.  
26  In Australia and the United Kingdom, the number of such orders has greatly increased in 
the past few years. Ibid; Innes, above n 4.  
27  For example, a sexual assault complainant's identity. Christine Boyle, 'Publication of 
Identifying Information about Sexual Assault Survivors: R v Canadian Newspapers Co Ltd' 
(1989) 3 Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 602. An Australian example is supplied by 
the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 91X which prohibits publication of the name of an applicant 
for a protection visa. 
28  See, eg, Hogan v Hinch (2011) 243 CLR 506. 
29  Sharon Rodrick, 'Open Justice and Suppressing Evidence of Police Methods: The Position 
in Canada and Australia, Part One' (2007) 31 Melbourne University Law Review 171. 
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III COMPARING AUSTRALIAN AND CANADIAN APPROACHES 
TO OPEN JUSTICE  
The common law contains a number of principles that are designed to ensure that 
court proceedings are physically accessible to the public, including the media. The 
question of whether open justice extends to providing access to court records is 
comparatively recent, reflecting the growth in importance of the documentary record 
in contemporary trial practice. After providing a general introduction to common law 
principles, this section demonstrates that judges in Australia and Canada have 
adopted somewhat different approaches to the principles of open justice even though 
they inherited the concept from a common British legal heritage. The discussion of 
Australian law suggests that Australian courts have not yet succeeded in delineating 
an approach that protects the core principles of open justice while maintaining 
sufficient flexibility to account for its heterogeneous manifestations. The comparison 
with Canada demonstrates that common law practice in that jurisdiction has provided 
a clearer approach to protecting open justice while respecting countervailing values 
such as privacy. The Canadian approach provides a possible model for future 
considerations of open justice by Australian courts. 
A An introduction to common law principles 
In 1893, Kay LJ identified the 'extreme importance that publicity should be given to all 
judicial proceedings.'30 The UK Supreme Court opened its first judgment of 2010 as 
follows: 
'Your first term docket reads like alphabet soup.' With these provocative words counsel 
for a number of newspapers and magazines highlighted the issue which confronts the 
Court in this application. In all the cases down for hearing in the first month of the 
Supreme Court's existence at least one of the parties was referred to by an initial or 
initials.31 
The Court went on to hold unanimously that the public interest in having access to 
information about court proceedings outweighed the privacy interests of five British 
nationals who were believed to be involved in terrorist activities: 
the legitimate interest of the public is wider than the interest of judges qua judges or of 
lawyers qua lawyers. Irrespective of the outcome, the public has a legitimate interest in 
not being kept in the dark[.] 
... 
At present, the courts are denying the public information which is relevant to that debate, 
even though the whole freezing-order system [of counter-terrorism measures] has been 
created and operated in their name.32 
Recognising the multiplicity of values that are potentially engaged when open 
justice is at stake, the UK Supreme Court emphasised that the public interest in 
disclosing the details of court proceedings must be balanced against privacy rights on a 
case-by-case basis. Nonetheless, In re Guardian News and Media Ltd and others holds that 
judges should avoid issuing anonymity orders unless there is specific evidence of 
potential harm to privacy or another protected right, even in terrorism-related cases. 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
30  Kimber v Press Association [1893] 1 QB 65, 75. 
31  In re Guardian News and Media Ltd and others [2010] 2 AC 697, 708 [1] (Guardian News and 
Media). 
32  Ibid 725 [68]–[69]. 
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Where specific evidence of a potential harm to privacy is offered, it remains essential to 
demonstrate that this harm outweighs the harm that will be caused by the requested 
limitation to freedom of expression. While the primary contribution of the case is that 
it sets out an approach to managing conflicting rights and freedoms under the 
European Convention on Human Rights, Guardian News and Media also restates and 
affirms the benefits of the common law presumption of openness in judicial 
proceedings. Decided more than a century after Kimber v Press Association, Guardian 
News and Media suggests that the highest UK court continues to regard the principles of 
open justice as integral to the common law tradition despite political pressures to keep 
the state response to terrorism shrouded in secrecy. 
The leading common law case on open justice is Scott v Scott.33 A marriage 
nullification had occurred in camera. The appellant and her solicitor subsequently 
shared notes of the hearing with persons who had not been party to the proceeding. 
On appeal from a finding of contempt, the House of Lords was asked to consider 
whether the original order to close the courtroom was within the trial judge's power. A 
majority of Law Lords agreed that no jurisdiction existed to close the court. However, 
they had differing views about whether and when a judge possessed the common law 
power to close a courtroom. Viscount Haldane held: 'If there is any exception to the 
broad principle which requires the administration of justice to take place in open court, 
that exception must be based on the application of some other and overriding 
principle'.34 Viscount Haldane proposed a test of necessity for such exceptions, 
identifying examples where necessity is met.35 Earl Halsbury preferred to leave the 
consideration of exceptions to the open court principle to another case.36 Earl Loreborn 
suggested that a courtroom could be closed in a limited category of cases.37 Lord Shaw 
spoke most strongly in support of open justice, suggesting that the orders made by the 
trial judge 'constitute a violation of that publicity in the administration of justice which 
is one of the surest guarantees of our liberties and an attack upon the very foundations 
of public and private security.'38 Lord Shaw quoted extensively from Bentham, holding 
that there are very limited circumstances in which privacy is warranted, and that the 
scope of any non-publicity order must be limited in duration.39  
While the lack of jurisdiction to close the court and prevent publication in Scott v 
Scott was broadly agreed, the precise limits on judicial power were more contested. 
The variety of approaches adopted reflects conceptual uncertainty about the function 
and limits of open justice. Depending on whether one prefers Viscount Haldane's 
reasoning to that of Earl Loreborn or Lord Shaw, the circumstances in which a 
courtroom may be closed could be limited to a set of categories established by 
precedent or governed by an overarching test of necessity.  
B The Australian approach to open justice 
Scott v Scott has had significant influence on Australian jurisprudence, but the variety 
of ratios adopted by the judges has bequeathed some uncertainty within the Australian 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
33  [1913] AC 417 (House of Lords). 
34  Ibid 435. 
35  Ibid 438. 
36  Ibid 442. 
37  Ibid 445–6. 
38  Ibid 476. 
39  Ibid 482–3. 
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law.40 More recently, an emerging jurisprudence suggests that open justice may also be 
protected — at least to some extent — by the principle of institutional integrity that 
regulates legislative and executive relationships with courts under Chapter III of the 
Australian Constitution. In Canada, open justice is regarded as a strong but defeasible 
common law right, which is subject to limits on a case-by-case basis where 
countervailing interests prevail. While Scott v Scott was initially influential, the 
Supreme Court of Canada ultimately adopted a more coherent approach.  
The Australian approach to open justice has at least two strands. A well-established 
common law approach establishes a presumption of open justice, permitting limits on 
open justice where 'necessary for the administration of justice'41 or 'in the interests of 
justice'.42 However, this common law rule will yield to contrary statutory provisions.43 
The second, constitutional, strand has emerged more recently. The High Court of 
Australia has held that Chapter III of the Australian Constitution proscribes legislatures 
from conferring a function or imposing a requirement on a judge or court 'which 
substantially impair[s] its essential and defining characteristics as a court.'44 The 
principle that Chapter III protects the continuing institutional integrity of courts arises 
from, but also refines, the reasoning in Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions.45 In Hogan 
v Hinch, the Court considered whether the principle extended to guaranteeing open 
justice within Chapter III courts. While the Court upheld the constitutionality of the 
Victorian legislation at stake, Hogan v Hinch affirms that open justice is an essential 
judicial characteristic. As I explain below, the Court's reasoning left open the 
possibility that legislation that trenches too far on open justice may contravene Chapter 
III. 
1 Australian Common Law Approach 
The High Court of Australia quickly adopted Scott v Scott into Australian common 
law.46 It has held on more than one occasion that judges have 'no inherent power' to 
close a courtroom, while finding that Parliament retains power to provide for the 
circumstances in which courts should be closed.47 In Dickason v Dickason, the Court did 
not comment on common law exceptions to the open justice principle. In Russell v 
Russell, a majority of the High Court struck down a provision of the Family Law Act 
1975 (Cth) which provided that all proceedings under that Act must be held in closed 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
40  Discussed below, page 10. 
41  R v Kwok (2005) 64 NSWLR 335. 
42  BUSB v The Queen (2011) 80 NSWLR 17; see also R v Macfarlane; Ex parte O'Flanagan (1923) 
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court. However, Russell was not a particularly strong endorsement of open justice. The 
Court split 3:2, with Mason and Jacob JJ holding in dissent that the federal Parliament 
could order state courts to hear federal proceedings in camera 
Of the majority, Barwick CJ noted the significance of the open court principle but 
struck down the impugned legislation on the basis that it constituted an impermissible 
interference with the states' constitutional power to provide for the organisation and 
operation of state courts.48 Gibbs and Stephen JJ wrote separate reasons from Barwick 
CJ and from one another, concurring in the result. Both Gibbs and Stephen JJ 
characterised the provision mandating closed courts as one which altered both the 
character of proceedings conducted under the Act, and the character of the courts 
charged with hearing those proceedings. Gibbs and Stephen JJ held that openness is an 
essential part of the character of common law courtrooms, and that mandating closed 
courtrooms changed the court into a different type of tribunal. However, Gibbs J 
would have upheld the constitutionality of the provision if it had merely granted trial 
judges the discretion to close courts in appropriate cases.49 The distinction between 
granting discretion and mandating closed courts remains important under the 
emerging constitutional principle of institutional integrity.  
The principles of open justice have received closer consideration in state and federal 
courts, particularly in NSW. Decisions issued by the NSW and Victorian Courts of 
Appeal and by the Full Federal Court have delineated the principles that apply within 
Australian law. Taken as a whole, these cases establish a working distinction between 
different infringements of the principles of open justice. For example, the case law 
suggests that judges view closing a courtroom as a more drastic infringement on open 
justice than restricting access to exhibits. Such distinctions are in keeping with the 
proposition that there are multiple principles of open justice, but the Australian case 
law does not expressly endorse this approach and individual decisions tend to refer to 
open justice in a relatively undifferentiated way. For example, in John Fairfax & Sons 
Ltd v Police Tribunal of NSW,50 the NSW Court of Appeal was asked to consider 
whether the Police Tribunal could issue an order suppressing the name of a witness. 
The Court held that open justice requires that proceedings be heard in open court, and 
that departure from this rule is only permitted where 'its observance would frustrate 
the administration of justice or some other public interest for whose protection 
Parliament has modified' the rule. The principle includes the rule that 'nothing should 
be done to discourage the making of fair and accurate reports of what occurs in the 
courtroom.'51 In the absence of parliamentary authorisation, an order prohibiting the 
publication of evidence given in open court is only valid if 'necessary to secure the 
proper administration of justice.'52 McHugh JA held that the capacity to publish 
reports of a proceeding was a 'common law right' that is vital to 'the proper working of 
an open and democratic society and to the maintenance of public confidence in the 
administration of justice.'53 He questioned whether a non-publication order could in 
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any event bind non-parties.54 McHugh JA's judgment explicitly connects open justice 
with democratic values and, in keeping with subsequent judgments of the NSW Court 
of Appeal, emphasises the need to limit infringements upon open justice.55 The 
decision also recognises that limits on open justice will vary with the nature of 
countervailing interests.  
The test of what is 'necessary to secure the proper administration of justice' would 
seemingly permit trial judges to issue non-publication orders in 'reasonably necessary' 
circumstances that are not contemplated by previous case law. More recently, the NSW 
Court of Appeal has moved towards a categorical approach to exceptions to open 
justice, coupled with an overriding test of necessity. In John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd 
v District Court of NSW, the Court suggested that the common law jurisdiction to grant 
non-publication orders is restricted to an established, and limited, set of categories.56 
These categories are not listed in Fairfax v District Court but were enumerated by 
Einstein J in Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank: 
There appear to be a limited number of general exceptions to the 'open justice' principle, 
... namely: 
(a)  cases where trade secrets, secret documents or communications or secret processes 
are involved; 
(b)  cases where disclosure in a public trial would defeat the whole object of the action 
(as in blackmail cases or cases involving police informers); 
(c)  cases involving the need to keep order in court; 
(d)  cases involving (in certain circumstances) national security; 
(e)  cases involving the performance of administrative or other action that may properly 
be dealt with in chambers; 
(f)  cases where the court sits as parens patriae involving wards of the state or those with 
mental illness.57 
Beyond these categories, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal held in Fairfax v District 
Court that an order prohibiting publication of a judgment may only be made if it is 
necessary in the sense that the objective of achieving a fair trial in a subsequent case 
could not be secured in any other way. The Court expressed doubt as to whether such 
necessity could ever be demonstrated.58  
In R v Kwok, Hodgson JA softened the position that common law exceptions are 
limited by precedent, holding that the Court 'will not freely invent new categories of 
cases, but ... may identify categories that, while not coinciding exactly with the existing 
categories, are very closely analogous to them and have the same rationale for the 
making of non-publication orders.'59 In Kwok, the Court held that the privacy interests 
of complainants in a sex trafficking case were very like those of a complainant in a 
blackmail case, and that the categories should be expanded accordingly.60 However, a 
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decision to make a non-publication order in respect of the names of the particular 
complainants depends on evidence of necessity in the instant case, and the case was 
returned to the District Court for reconsideration. While agreeing with Hodgson JA, 
Howie J added the following caution: 
[I]f this application were allowed it may encourage prosecutors to seek, and judges to 
make, non-publication orders in cases where the necessity for those orders to advance the 
interests of justice had not truly been shown. It is important in light of the material relied 
upon by the prosecution to stress that it is the interests of justice that lie at the heart of 
such an application and not the interests of a private individual, such as a witness or an 
accused. The decided cases have emphasised the value of open courts to maintaining 
public confidence in the administration of justice.61 
In this paragraph, Howie J sets out the competing interests at stake when an 
application for non-publication of a witness's name is made, and emphasises the 
primacy of open justice. Howie J preferred that new classes of exceptions be 
established by Parliament.62  
While Kwok, Fairfax v District Court and Idoport v National Australia Bank suggest that 
courts possess inherent power to issue non-publication orders that will bind non-
parties, the existence of this power was questioned in Fairfax v Police Tribunal and 
Raybos v Jones. This issue remains unsettled in Australian case law, and may become 
important in light of conflicting decisions of the Privy Council in Independent Publishing 
Co Ltd v Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago63 and the New Zealand Court of 
Appeal in Siemer v Solicitor-General.64 While the Privy Council has expressed the 
conclusion that no such power exists, the New Zealand Court held that a power to 
issue non-publication orders is within the inherent capacity of a court to regulate its 
own procedures with the ultimate goal of securing fairness. 
The NSW Parliament has rendered the question of inherent power less relevant in 
that jurisdiction by passing the Court Suppression and Non-Publication Orders Act 2010 
(NSW), which codifies five broad grounds on which a suppression or non-publication 
order may be justified. These grounds are not quite the same as those articulated in 
prior case law, but include the necessity to protect the safety of a person, a limited 
power to issue orders to prevent embarrassment and a capacity to issue an order 
where a countervailing public interest outweighs the public interest in open justice.65 
In cases decided since the Act came into force, the NSW Court of Appeal has continued 
to assert the relevance of prior case law.66 However, the possibility that some limits on 
open justice may operate differently from others is being recognised more overtly. For 
example, in Fairfax v Ibrahim, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal observed that there 
are circumstances in which the public interest in freedom of discussion operates in 
tension with the public interest in promoting the administration of justice; and 
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circumstances in which these values act in concert.67 In Rinehart v Welker, Tobias AJA 
held that open justice was a primary objective of the administration of justice, which 
exists alongside other objectives.68 Neither case proposes a methodology for 
reconciling inconsistencies between such objectives. In fact, the Australian case law is 
uniformly silent on the questions of how to decide among competing objectives when 
open justice is at stake, and on what evidence of interference with countervailing 
interests is needed to support an application to limit open justice.69 
The Victorian Court of Appeal has also held that necessity is the touchstone for 
non-publication orders.70 However, in recent cases it has adopted a relatively generous 
interpretation of necessity. The Victorian Court of Appeal held in News Digital Media 
Pty Ltd v Mokbel that a trial court possesses inherent jurisdiction to postpone 
publication of court proceedings, including verdicts, in order to protect trial fairness in 
an impending trial.71 The Court applied a test of whether there was a 'real risk' that 
publishing the material would 'interfere substantially with the administration of justice 
in a pending proceeding.'72 Non-publication orders published in these circumstances 
should be time limited. In News Digital Media Pty Ltd v Mokbel, the Court held that non-
publication orders should not extend to requiring online news services to remove 
archived articles where those articles are only accessible by searching.73 The Court 
held that this order was not necessary to protect trial fairness given the warnings 
routinely issued to jurors to refrain from researching a case. 
While there are some inconsistencies, it is implicit within the judicial discussions of 
non-publication orders that some principles of open justice — for example, the 
importance of permitting the public to know about a verdict or judgment — are more 
vigorously protected than others — for example, the capacity to publish the identity of 
a witness.74 Countervailing values also appear to influence the outcome of an 
application to restrain open justice — for example, News Digital Media Pty Ltd v Mokbel 
turns on the primacy of an accused person's right to a fair trial, and may fairly be 
distinguished from the NSW cases which consider a witness's request for privacy. 
Likewise, in that case the Victorian Court of Appeal explicitly adopts a hierarchy of 
principles when it treats the interest in reporting evidence given in a court proceeding 
as more central to open justice than the capacity to report extra-judicial information 
that readers may find interesting. 
Australian case law concerning public access to court records exhibits considerably 
more ambivalence about the open justice principle in that context. The NSW Court of 
Appeal was asked in John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Ryde Local Court to decide 
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whether a right of access to court records existed at common law.75 The applicant 
sought access to court records associated with an apprehended violence order issued 
by consent against a high profile Magistrate. Seemingly distancing itself from the 
language used by McHugh JA in Fairfax v Police Tribunal,76 the Court held that open 
justice is a principle rather than a right; and that the principle does not encompass a 
routine capacity to obtain access to documents held as part of the court record.77 Given 
that an apprehended violence order could be issued without a magistrate being 
satisfied that the alleged violence had occurred, and as this order was issued by 
consent, the Court held that it was sufficient for a judge to give reporters access to the 
fact that a complaint had been laid and a consent order issued, and the terms of the 
order. However, Spigelman CJ held that a media request for access to documents used 
in open court should ordinarily be granted, as the principle of open justice is engaged 
once documents are used in this manner.78 In Herald & Weekly Times Ltd v Magistrates' 
Court of Victoria, the Victorian Court of Appeal rejected an argument that there is a 
right to obtain access to the hand up brief on which many committal proceedings are 
now decided in Victoria in lieu of hearing oral evidence. However, the Court also held 
that magistrates have the power to authorise access to this brief.79 
The reasoning adopted in these cases seems in keeping with the proposition that 
information relied upon by a court is more central to the principles of open justice than 
information that is contained within the court record but not expressly relied upon. 
Nonetheless, the tone adopted in these two decisions is notably different from that 
adopted by the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal in cases concerning non-publication 
orders. When the capacity to report testimony and judgments is at stake, open justice 
tends to be treated as an essential good, albeit one which must sometimes yield to 
more pressing objectives. By contrast, the courts downplay the importance of open 
justice when considering requests for court records, even when those records have 
been used in open court. The legitimate concern underlying the court records cases is 
the possibility that media will report allegations of wrongdoing in a manner that 
suggests those allegations have been proven.80 Even so, the courts' reluctance to 
enforce a stronger principle of access to court records marks a particularly interesting 
shift. Having access to committal records or to the documentary record on which 
interlocutory orders are issued is arguably an important dimension of exercising 
democratic oversight in relation to the actions of courts and Crown prosecutors.81 
Equally, the concern about misreporting allegations of wrongdoing is similarly present 
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whenever the media reports oral evidence given or legal arguments made prior to a 
trial or verdict. It is difficult to identify a principled basis on which textual records 
should be treated differently than sworn testimony, particularly when the textual 
record explicitly replaces oral evidence and forms the basis for judicial decisions. 
Those who seek to enforce the principles of open justice are often media outlets. 
Despite this pattern, the Australian case law lacks a consistent approach to the 
relationship between media and the principles of open justice. Media outlets receive 
some recognition of their special status by, for example, receiving notice of non-
publication orders and being permitted standing to appeal such orders. However, 
Hutley AP suggested in Syme v GM-Holden’s that there is no special priority attaching 
to the press or other media. Rather, '[t]he privilege to see what the courts do and say 
belongs to the public generally.'82 In Fairfax v Ryde Local Court, Spigelman CJ rejected 
the proposition that freedom of expression or freedom of the press were legitimate 
ends of open justice, holding that open justice 'has purposes related to the operation of 
the legal system.'83 Some judges have expressed mistrust of the media in the course of 
adjudicating applications for access. Decisions have aired concerns that media may 
publicise speculative or prejudicial information about one or another party, thereby 
damaging reputations and imperilling the right to a fair trial.84  
By contrast, in R v Davis, the Full Federal Court suggested that journalists play a 
different role in relation to court proceedings from that of other observers:  
Whatever their motives in reporting, their opportunity to do so arises out of a principle 
that is fundamental to our society and method of government: except in extraordinary 
circumstances, the courts of the land are open to the public. This principle arises out of 
the belief that exposure to public scrutiny is the surest safeguard against any risk of the 
courts abusing their considerable powers. As few members of the public have the time, or 
even the inclination, to attend courts in person, in a practical sense this principle 
demands that the media be free to report what goes on in them.85 
In some cases, trial judges have relied upon the principle of open justice to grant media 
access to documents that have been used in open court.86 These judges have reasoned 
that providing access will assist the public to understand the basis on which orders 
have been made and help reporters to cover court proceedings fairly and accurately. 
Their judgments emphasise the need to trust the media to report proceedings with 
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appropriate restraint.87 The alternative approaches to media access discernible within 
the case law suggests that Australian judges have not yet settled upon a principled 
understanding of the role that media plays in relation to open justice. As I later explain, 
Canadian courts have provided a more complete account of the media's role vis-a-vis 
open justice. 
2 Australian Constitutional Principles 
Legislative restraints on open justice are far more numerous than those anticipated 
under common law, and so it is important to consider whether there are constitutional 
limits on the legislative power to restrain open justice. However, until very recently the 
complexities of Australian federalism seemed to present a significant barrier to a 
coherent position on whether any constitutional principle limits legislative and 
executive powers to infringe upon open justice. The Australian Constitution has been 
interpreted to require a separation of judicial power from legislative and executive 
functions at the federal level, but state constitutions have no such requirement. Federal 
judicial power may be vested in both state and federal courts. When a state court is 
invested with federal power, the federal government must respect the state's rights to 
provide for organisation and operation of that court.88 On the other hand, 'Chapter III 
courts' (those exercising or possessing the capacity to exercise federal judicial power) 
must be allowed to operate in a court-like manner.89 Therefore, Chapter III of the 
Australian Constitution will limit parliamentary and executive power to regulate the 
openness of judicial proceedings if the various activities that comprise open justice are 
part of the 'essential character of a court or ... the nature of judicial power'.90  
In Kable, a majority of the High Court of Australia held that an implied 
constitutional requirement of institutional integrity prevents state legislatures from 
vesting non-judicial (executive or administrative) powers in Chapter III courts if the 
exercise of that power is incompatible with the exercise of federal judicial powers. 
McHugh J expressed this principle in terms of reasonable perceptions of judicial 
independence:  
While nothing in Ch III prevents a State from conferring non-judicial functions on a State 
Supreme Court in respect of non-federal matters, those non-judicial functions cannot be 
of a nature that might lead an ordinary reasonable member of the public to conclude that 
the Court was not independent of the executive government of the State.91 
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Other passages in the Kable decision suggested that the implied limitation is concerned 
with protecting essential characteristics of the judicial process.92 Subsequent 
formulations of the Kable principle have tended to focus on these institutional 
characteristics, of which independence is arguably an important element. For example, 
Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ articulated the Kable principle as follows: 
[T]he relevant principle is one which hinges upon maintenance of the defining 
characteristics of a 'court' ... It is to those characteristics that the reference to 'institutional 
integrity' alludes. That is, if the institutional integrity of a court is distorted, it is because 
the body no longer exhibits in some relevant respect those defining characteristics which 
mark a court apart from other decision-making bodies.93 
The refined Kable principle is most precisely referred to as a principle that safeguards 
the institutional integrity of Chapter III courts. However, attempts to further define the 
principle have proven somewhat unsuccessful. In fact, French CJ has twice referred to 
the undesirability of reducing the principle of institutional integrity to a test or 
formulation which dictates future outcomes.94 
While Kable was regularly relied upon in argument before the High Court of 
Australia, attempts by parties to apply the doctrine failed for several years. Until 2009, 
a majority of the High Court invariably distinguished Kable, seemingly confining that 
case largely to its facts. In that sense, prior to International Finance Trust Co Ltd v NSW 
Crime Commission,95 the Kable decision had largely fallen dormant.96 However since 
then, the High Court of Australia has articulated and applied a version of the Kable 
doctrine at least seven times.97 On three occasions, it has struck down state legislation 
based on a principle of institutional integrity.98 Quite suddenly, a wealth of judicial 
reasoning has refined and clarified the scope and potential application of constitutional 
principles emerging from Kable. The relevance of this constitutional reasoning to 
legislative and executive checks on open justice was most directly addressed in Hogan 
v Hinch. However, a number of earlier decisions set the context in which the defendant 
in Hogan v Hinch argued that open justice was an essential defining characteristic of 
judicial process. 
In several cases decided since Russell v Russell, individual High Court judges have 
relied upon the principle of open justice in cases that largely turned on other matters. 
In a widely cited dissent in Re Nolan; Ex parte Young, Gaudron J held that the essential 
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features of the 'judicial process' include 'open and public inquiry'.99 Her Honour went 
on to hold that 'open and public proceedings are necessary in the public interest 
because secrecy is conducive to the abuse of power and, thus, to injustice.'100 In Grollo v 
Palmer, McHugh J held, in dissent, that '[o]pen justice is the hallmark of the common 
law system of justice and is an essential characteristic of the exercise of federal judicial 
power.'101 In a concurring decision in K-Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court, 
French CJ described the open justice principle as 'an essential part of the functioning of 
courts in Australia', but upheld a statutory provision that had on this occasion been 
applied in a manner that infringed this principle.102 French CJ held that statutes which 
regulate court processes should, as far as possible, be interpreted in a manner 
consistent with the requirements of open justice. He applied this interpretive principle 
in K-Generation. 
Each of the cases mentioned so far engages with the power to order closed 
courtrooms, or to hear evidence in camera. In Re Application by the Chief Commissioner of 
Police (Vic), the High Court was asked to consider an application made for orders that 
would prevent the publication of evidence given in open court.103 This evidence 
related to investigative practices of police,104 and the Commissioner sought an 
indefinite publication ban. The Court declined to engage with the substantive issues 
raised by the case, finding that the Commissioner had not met her burden to 
demonstrate why leave to appeal should be granted from the trial judge's decision to 
issue the orders. 
Given a substantial rise in the number and variety of non-publication orders being 
issued in Australia, it was inevitable that the refined Kable principle would be relied 
upon to pursue judicial suggestions that open justice is an essential characteristic of 
courts.105 Hogan v Hinch raised a constitutional challenge to s 42 of the Serious Sex 
Offenders Monitoring Act 2005 (Vic) ('the Act').106 The Act empowered Victorian courts 
to make and enforce community supervision orders in respect of sex offenders who 
had served their custodial sentence. Section 42 permitted the court, 'if satisfied that it is 
in the public interest', to make an order prohibiting publication, inter alia, of material 
which could identify a person as being the subject of a community supervision 
proceeding. The defendant Hinch, a controversial media figure, allegedly contravened 
orders made under s 42 of the Act by publishing names on his website and identifying 
offenders at a public rally. He challenged s 42 on the basis that it distorted the 
institutional integrity of courts, was contrary to an implied requirement 'that all State 
and federal courts must be open to the public and carry out their activities in public' 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
99  (1991) 172 CLR 460, 496. 
100  Ibid 496–7. 
101  (1995) 184 CLR 348, 379.  
102  K-Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court (2009) 237 CLR 501. The majority held that the 
procedure infringed the open justice principle. However, properly interpreted, the 
legislation was not incompatible with the exercise of federal judicial power.  
103  (2005) 214 ALR 422.  
104  Very little information is given about these investigative practices in the judgment, other 
than that they relate to 'scenarios' used to help obtain admissions from suspects. 
105  Innes, above n 4. 
106  Hogan v Hinch (2011) 243 CLR 506. The Act has now been repealed and replaced with the 
Serious Sex Offenders (Detention and Supervision) Act 2009 (Vic). 
404 Federal Law Review Volume 40 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
and contravened the implied freedom of political expression.107 The High Court of 
Australia unanimously upheld the constitutionality of s 42 and denied any absolute 
requirement of open justice.  
The brief leading judgment was written by Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan, 
Kiefel and Bell JJ. These judges held that s 42 did not impermissibly impair the status 
of Chapter III courts as independent and impartial tribunals because the phrase 'in the 
public interest', while broad, conferred a legitimate discretionary power upon 
courts.108 The expectation that a court would issue reasons for decision, and the 
availability of ordinary rights of appeal, together with the requirement of subjective 
mens rea within the offence created by s 42 bolstered the conclusion that this section 
was constitutionally valid.  
The leading judgment distinguished limits on the legislative power to regulate 
open justice from those exceptions which apply to the common law presumption of 
open justice. Adopting Gibbs J's reasoning from Russell v Russell,109 the leading 
judgment held that there is no 'restriction drawn from Ch III which in absolute terms 
limits the exercise of the legislative power of the Parliament'.110 It is implicit within the 
majority's acceptance of Gibbs J's reasoning that a statutory or executive rule which 
required closed proceedings in all cases may impair the institutional integrity of the 
court and thereby violate the refined Kable principle. 
Chief Justice French issued separate and more lengthy reasons. He held more 
clearly than the leading judgment that an 'essential characteristic of courts is that they 
sit in public.'111 The entitlement to publish a fair and accurate report of proceedings, 
including the documentary record, was characterised by French CJ as a 'common law 
corollary' to open justice.112 French CJ would have adopted a principle of statutory 
interpretation that minimised interference with all kinds of open justice (not just open 
courtrooms), while accepting the constitutionality of statutes which grant discretionary 
powers to infringe open justice.  
Hogan v Hinch represents a mixed outcome for proponents of open justice. It now 
seems relatively clear that (some) principles of open justice are among the essential 
characteristics of courts, and therefore attract (some) constitutional protection. The 
basic requirement that legislative restrictions on open justice should be expressed in 
permissive and discretionary rather than directive terms has the potential to safeguard 
open justice, but does not seem to apply to all circumstances. For example, it raises 
questions about the constitutionality of provisions that impose blanket restrictions on 
open justice without providing the tools to resolve those questions.113 To date, the 
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Court has not defined the substance of open justice, suggested a methodology by 
which courts should exercise legislatively granted discretion to infringe open justice, or 
provided clear guidance about the limits of legislative power to interfere with open 
justice. Pressing questions about the nature and limits of open justice remain 
unanswered within Australian law.  
3 Conclusion: Australian approaches to open justice 
The Australian case law on open justice principles frequently articulates the 
importance of these principles to common law courts. Australian judges are 
nonetheless customarily reticent to recognise anything approaching a 'right' to open 
justice. Despite their asserted centrality, Australian case law has not yet coalesced 
around a coherent theory of the substance of open justice principles. Intermediate 
courts' decisions suggests that common law exceptions to the principle may be based 
on necessity, or may need to fit within one of a limited number of pre-existing 
categories. There exists considerable ambivalence about whether there is a strong 
common law principle of openness in relation to access to court records, as compared 
with the higher priority placed on openness in relation to oral proceedings.  
Deference to parliament is apparent in all levels of the case law, although a limit to 
this deference appears from the High Court's emphasis on the need to grant discretion 
to courts that are statutorily empowered to restrict open justice. If unchecked, 
deference to parliament has the potential to become a particular threat to the principle 
of open justice. Returning to a core value of open justice — its capacity to promote 
informed debate about government, its processes and participants — the executive and 
legislative arms of government will, at times, have a considerable vested interest in 
maintaining secrecy in respect of some matters that come before the courts.114 Courts 
have a fundamental obligation to decide sensitive disputes impartially, according to 
generally applicable principles, and publicly. The implied constitutional principle of 
institutional integrity seems to permit courts invested with federal power to guard the 
common law tradition of openness to some extent. However, a lack of sustained 
attention to core principles, and a failure to consider how the heterogeneous 
manifestations of open justice engage those principles differently has led to 
inconsistencies within the Australian approach to court records and the role of the 
media. Appellate courts have offered little guidance to trial judges about how best to 
steer a course between safeguarding open justice and protecting countervailing 
interests. In contrast, Canadian courts have crafted a more coherent test that seeks to 
vindicate the principle of open justice in the most challenging cases, while paying 
careful attention to countervailing interests. 
C The Canadian approach to open justice 
The Supreme Court of Canada has articulated a strong commitment to the principle 
that any decision to limit public access to courts and court records should not be taken 
lightly. Canadian judges have sought to articulate a structured approach to balancing 
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open justice principles with countervailing interests. The Canadian approach posits a 
special role for the media in informing citizens who are unable to attend court about 
what has transpired there. While this approach has been influenced by the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms,115 the Supreme Court of Canada has also articulated a common 
law foundation for its approach to open justice. 
In Attorney General of Nova Scotia v MacIntyre, the Court identified a common law 
right to access court records.116 The Court considered whether a journalist could obtain 
access to a search warrant and associated information.117 The majority identified a 
number of 'broad policy considerations' at stake, including individual rights to 
privacy, protection of the administration of justice, the need to implement 
parliamentary intention with respect to search warrants and 'a strong public policy in 
favour of "openness" in respect of judicial acts.'118 Rejecting the argument that privacy 
interests justify routine secrecy in respect of executed search warrants, Dickson J 
declared that 'covertness is the exception and openness the rule' in relation to court 
records.119 Open access is accordingly presumptive but this 'right' can be curtailed to 
the extent necessary to protect an ongoing investigation, for example if a search 
warrant had not yet been executed. A fruitless search warrant should remain sealed in 
order to protect the privacy interests of innocent people. 
MacIntyre preceded the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms by three months, 
and the common law right identified in that case was soon supplemented with s 2(b) of 
the Charter, which protects the right to freedom of expression, including freedom of the 
press and other media. In a series of decisions beginning with Edmonton Journal v 
Alberta (Attorney General),120 the Supreme Court of Canada has identified the right to 
gain access to and communicate information regarding court proceedings as a core 
aspect of section 2(b). Based on this right, the Court struck down a statutory provision 
which significantly restricted the information that could be published about divorces 
and associated proceedings.121 Writing the leading judgment, Cory J held that 'the 
courts must be open to public scrutiny and to public criticism of their operation'.122 
The media were regarded as central to this openness, because freedom of expression 
incorporates a 'right to information pertaining to public institutions', meaning that 
those who are unable to attend court have a right to learn what has transpired there.123 
Cory J held that this right applies equally to court proceedings and court 
documents.124  
In Dagenais v Canadian Broadcasting Corporation,125 Lamer CJ disapproved the 
hierarchical common law approach to balancing freedom of expression and the right to 
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a fair trial, which prioritized the right to a fair trial above countervailing rights.126 
Lamer CJ held instead that courts must achieve a balance between fair trial and other 
rights when they come into competition with one another.127 The majority emphasized 
the range and complexity of interests at stake regarding publication bans. This 
recognition stemmed to a significant extent from the context of the case, which 
concerned applications by several accused in historical sexual assault cases for orders 
restraining the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation from airing a fictional program 
about sexual assault in Catholic orphanages.128 The program did not report court 
proceedings and so did not directly engage the principles of open justice, but the 
Court's reasoning was quickly applied to non-publication orders and other 
infringements on open justice. Lamer CJ reformulated the common law rule in which 
the right to a fair trial had been prioritised over the right to freedom of expression. 
Restated, the Charter-compliant common law rule asks whether a publication ban is 
necessary to prevent a real and substantial risk to the fairness of the trial or another 
pressing interest and, if so, whether the salutary effects of the ban (in protecting a fair 
trial) outweigh its deleterious effects (on freedom of expression, broadly construed by 
the Court).129 The test places the evidentiary and persuasive burden on the party 
seeking to infringe upon open justice.  
The Court elaborated on achieving proportionality between open justice and 
countervailing interests in Canadian Broadcasting Corporation v New Brunswick (Attorney-
General).130 The Court unanimously upheld the constitutionality of a statutory 
provision which permitted a sentencing judge to exclude members of the public from 
proceedings where necessary to uphold the proper administration of justice. The Court 
held that the statutory provision enabled a judge to craft orders which achieved 
proportionality between competing Charter rights to freedom of expression, fair trial 
and privacy, while promoting the proper administration of justice. The Court 
emphasised that the proper balance between these interests is context-dependent, and 
will vary from case to case. In R v Mentuck,131 the Court confirmed the broad 
application of a proportionality test:  
the relevant rights and interests will be aligned differently in different cases, and the 
purposes and effects invoked by the parties must be taken into account in a case-specific 
manner. ... The consideration of unrepresented interests must not be taken lightly.132 
The Court emphasised that the trial judge must look for reasonable alternatives to a 
publication ban, and restrict the scope of any ban as far as possible in order to 
safeguard open justice.  
An express methodology, which starts from the presumption of promoting open 
justice, has therefore emerged from the Canadian case law. The Dagenais-Mentuck test 
requires the Court to engage in a careful identification of the interests engaged by an 
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application to limit open justice — including those interests that are not directly 
represented by any party to the proceeding.133 Next, the necessity of the limit on open 
justice to protect a substantial countervailing interest must be considered, with explicit 
attention paid to the availability and reasonableness of alternative measures. If a limit 
to open justice is necessary, the court considers the salutary effects of the ban and 
weighs those benefits against its deleterious effects on the interests that were broadly 
defined in the first step. The limit will be imposed only if its benefits outweigh its 
harms, and the scope of that limit will be as narrow as is reasonable to achieve the 
salutary effect. The burden of demonstrating the necessity for a limit on open justice 
remains with the party seeking that limit throughout the process.  
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks ushered in a new era of government 
secrecy, and a heightened sense of the potential risks of openness in court proceedings. 
In the wake of 9/11, Canada introduced new substantive crimes and special 
procedures for investigating suspected terrorist offences. One such provision 
permitted an investigative hearing to take place, in which witnesses were compelled to 
attend and answer questions about suspected terrorist offences.  
The first judge to conduct an investigative hearing ruled that it should 
presumptively be conducted in camera. The Supreme Court of Canada rejected this 
presumption. It restated the open court principle as 'a hallmark of a democratic society' 
and a 'principal component of the legitimacy of the judicial process'.134 While a 
majority accepted that large parts of investigative hearings may necessarily be secret, it 
held that both the existence of an investigative hearing and as much of the proceedings 
as possible should be made public.135 The burden of proving the need for secrecy 
remains on the party seeking to close the courtroom. The majority took this 
opportunity to speak strongly against the temptations of secrecy: 'The unfolding of 
events in this case also illustrates how antithetical to judicial process secret court 
hearings are. Courthouses are public places.'136 In 2005, perhaps weary of repeating 
itself, a unanimous Court rejected an application by the Crown to seal search warrants 
and associated court records: 'This argument is doomed to failure by more than two 
decades of unwavering decisions in this Court'. 137 
The Court has also upheld limitations on open justice principles, particularly where 
these limitations are temporary or narrowly drawn. In all cases, such limitations are 
justified on the strength of countervailing interests. In Re Vancouver Sun, Justice 
Iacobucci concluded that an application for an investigative hearing must necessarily 
be held in camera and ex parte. In that decision, the majority also acknowledged that 
applications for search warrants should also be held in camera and ex parte.138 In 
Vickery v Nova Scotia,139 the Court upheld a decision to deny journalists permission to 
take a copy of a confession that was excluded from a trial on the grounds that it was 
involuntarily obtained. In other cases, the Supreme Court of Canada has upheld 
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publication bans on complainants' names in sexual offence cases,140 and confirmed the 
constitutionality of court rules that limit court reporters' use of television cameras and 
interview requests in courthouses.141 Adult defendants' names are often withheld 
where identifying the defendant would also identify the complainant. However, the 
Court has consistently overruled more sweeping publication bans.  
The upshot of this whirlwind tour of the Canadian approach to open justice is a 
strong and persistent commitment to the principle that open justice is a right that 
should not lightly be infringed. The Court has consistently reinforced the starting 
presumption of openness, and emphasized that exclusion should constitute the 
exception. The Court has also developed the Dagenais/Mentuck test to guide a trial 
judge's determination of whether open access should be limited in a given case.142 This 
principle extends a 'firm guarantee of access' to information about court proceedings, 
including court records.143 In contrast to the somewhat confusing and sometimes 
contradictory Australian jurisprudence, the Canadian case law has struck a relatively 
coherent balance between the principle of open justice and countervailing interests, 
providing clear guidance to trial judges who are tasked with securing open justice, and 
maintaining a strong sense of independence from legislative and executive impulses 
towards secrecy. While the Charter has played an important role in the development of 
the Dagenais/Mentuck test, the Canadian courts have also identified freestanding 
common law bases on which to protect open justice.144  
By directing courts to identify and protect the underlying values of open justice 
while accounting for the diversity of countervailing interests that may arise on a case-
by-case basis, the Dagenais/Mentuck test offers a structured approach to managing the 
heterogeneity of open justice. The Court's rejection of any principled distinction 
between access to court records and access to court proceedings is in keeping with this 
focus on the underlying purposes and values of open justice. The Canadian approach 
is designed to achieve maximum protection of open justice while safeguarding 
pressing countervailing interests such as the privacy of sexual assault complainants.  
A key difference between the Canadian and Australian approaches lies in the 
preparedness of the Supreme Court of Canada to recognise that the benefits of open 
justice extend well beyond the media's commercial interest in maximising 
circulation.145 Canadian jurisprudence tends to focus on the rights of Canadian citizens 
to participate in discussion about governance, characterising Canadians' 'right to know 
about the civil or criminal justice system' as the end to which journalistic access to 
court information is directed.146 In this regard, the Canadian approach is very like that 
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adopted by the UK Supreme Court in Guardian News and Media.147 This approach 
adopts the values central to open justice as a compass by which one may find the right 
direction through particular disputes about openness. 
IV CONCLUSION  
Open justice describes a variety of practices that share a common focus on information 
about courts and a common goal of enabling informed scrutiny of government 
institutions. Three key features of open justice were identified in section 2: its purposes 
are multivalent; it can be exercised in diverse ways; and it is not absolute but must be 
weighed against other values. While the common law has a longstanding commitment 
to open courtrooms, and to enabling fair and accurate reporting of court proceedings, 
access to court records is a more contested dimension of the principles of open justice 
in Australia.  
Contemporary judicial pronouncements in Canada and England suggest a strong 
commitment to open justice. This is especially true of Canada, where the 
Dagenais/Mentuck test applies to any measure taken to infringe open justice and adopts 
an expansive interpretation of activities protected by that 'right'. The primary benefit of 
the Canadian approach is that it accounts for the variety of interests at stake when 
open justice is engaged, with particular attention to the public interest in knowing 
about court processes and government action; and provides guidance to trial judges 
who must decide applications to limit open justice. Rather than adopting a binary 
approach to granting access, Canadian courts have crafted outcomes which maximise 
the openness of justice while safeguarding pressing countervailing interests such as the 
privacy of sexual assault complainants. A key dimension of the Canadian approach is a 
resistance to categorical reasoning in favour of a recognition that the diverse principles 
of open justice, and the range of countervailing interests that may potentially be 
engaged, require careful analysis on a case-by-case basis. The Dagenais/Mentuck test 
structures that analysis in a manner that ensures that no single interest is prioritised 
without regard to others. Under the Canadian approach, the sphere of conflict between 
open justice and countervailing principles is carefully delineated before any decision to 
limit open justice is contemplated. When a direct conflict arises the court first decides 
whether the public interest requires that open justice should yield to a countervailing 
interest in the particular circumstances and, if so, seeks to achieve a resolution that 
impairs open justice as little as possible while safeguarding the prioritised interest. 
This approach provides a helpful template for Australian courts.  
In Australia, the status of some open justice principles is considerably more 
uncertain. The High Court of Australia has not offered clear guidance about open 
justice, although it seemingly now considers some aspects of open courts to be an 
essential characteristic of the judicial process. Older case law emphasises parliament's 
power to limit the principle of open justice, but emerging Chapter III case law provides 
a potential foundation from which to challenge the margins of that power. Judgments 
suggest that statutes may vest judges with discretion to limit open justice but also hold 
that parliament must not mandate closed courts.148 Very little case law addresses how 
trial judges should exercise a broadly phrased statutory discretion to limit open justice, 
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and it is unclear whether courts possess an inherent power to issue non-publication 
orders that bind non-parties. The prevailing common law approach to limits on open 
justice seemingly turns on whether an application fits within a rigid set of pre-existing 
categories, or their analogues. This approach steers judges away from substantive 
engagement with the values protected by open justice, and those that stand opposed to 
it. However, the discussion provided in section 2 of this article suggests that open 
justice is too fundamental to judicial integrity and the separation of powers to be 
rendered vulnerable to parliamentary or executive control and too chimeric to be 
reduced to ossified categories of exclusion and inclusion. The Canadian approach to 
balancing the principle of open justice against competing values is to be preferred. 
One common theme is the role of the media vis-a-vis the principle of open justice. 
The public interest in knowing about courts provides compelling reasons to adopt a 
robust system of open justice. However, Australian judges have expressed concern 
about the extent to which media outlets can be trusted to discharge their obligations to 
provide fair and accurate reporting of court proceedings. In cases where access is 
denied or non-publication orders are issued, judges in both jurisdictions often cite a 
concern about whether media reports of a proceeding will be inflammatory or simply 
misunderstood. This concern is arguably well-founded, and it is particularly acute in 
respect of jury trials prior to the commencement of a trial. However, general concern 
about media trustworthiness should not, in the absence of more specific evidence, 
compel non-publication orders or denials of access to court records.  
The public interest in obtaining access to detailed and knowledgeable information 
about court processes should never be curtailed without careful consideration. In the 
absence of detailed and accurate information, misconception and prejudice is likely to 
flourish. Media can report court proceedings more accurately (and thereby be held to 
correspondingly higher standards) if they have access to better information. The need 
to ensure good information is particularly acute in cases which depend on a detailed 
documentary record or which turn on technical arguments. An increase in lengthy and 
complicated cases, coupled with a growing reliance on documentary records, 
highlights the need for effective public access to court records.  
Judges and legal academics share an interest in encouraging informed debate and 
discussion about the judicial system: 
The law, of course, largely controls the degree to which the open court principle is 
respected. 'Legal culture', however, has as much to do with the fortunes of the 'open 
court principle' as does the law. The law often provides only standards — not clear 
answers. The extent to which the open court principle is respected therefore comes down 
to attitude or the commitment to it among justice system participants.149 
Although there are risks inherent in openness, retreating to covertness holds 
tremendous dangers for the justice system and for democratic governance. Australia 
deserves a more fully reasoned judicial commitment to open justice than it has, in 
recent years, received.  
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